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Centralized vs. de-centralized multinationals and taxes

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dc.creator Nielsen, Søren Bo
dc.creator Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis
dc.creator Schjelderup, Guttorm
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:02:36Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:02:36Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19050
dc.identifier ppn:503740586
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19050
dc.description The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise?s choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs - here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument -, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large.
dc.language eng
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1586
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject F23
dc.subject H25
dc.subject L23
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject centralized vs. de-centralized decisions
dc.subject taxes
dc.subject MNEs
dc.subject Multinationales Unternehmen
dc.subject Steuer
dc.subject Organisationsstruktur
dc.subject Transferpreis
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Centralized vs. de-centralized multinationals and taxes
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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