أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Konrad, Kai A.
dc.creator Skaperdas, Stergios
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:02:31Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:02:31Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19042
dc.identifier ppn:503713147
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19042
dc.description We examine a stark setting in which security or protection can be provided by self-governing groups or by for-profit entrepreneurs (kings, kleptocrats, or mafia dons). Though selfgovernance is best for the population, it faces problems of long-term viability. Typically, in providing security the equilibrium market structure involves competing lords, a condition that leads to a tragedy of coercion: all the savings from the provision of collective protection are dissipated and welfare can be as low as, or even lower than, in the absence of the state.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1578
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject H10
dc.subject D70
dc.subject D30
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject property rights
dc.subject anarchy
dc.subject government
dc.subject Kriminalitätsökonomik
dc.subject Innere Sicherheit
dc.subject Sicherheitsgewerbe
dc.subject Organisierte Kriminalität
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title The market for protection and the origin of the state
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط