أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Conde-Ruiz, Jose Ignacio
dc.creator Galasso, Vincenzo
dc.creator Profeta, Paola
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:02:29Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:02:29Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19035
dc.identifier ppn:503705349
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19035
dc.description We provide a long-term perspective on the individual retirement behaviour and on the future of retirement. In a Markovian political economic theoretical framework, in which incentives to retire early are embedded, we derive a political equilibrium with positive social security contribution rates and early retirement. Aging has two opposite effects: it leads to lower taxes and fewer (early) retirees, while a poorer median voter will push for higher contributions. The model highlights the existence of crucial income effects: a decrease of the income of young people will induce them to postpone retirement and to vote for less social security.
dc.language eng
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1571
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject H55
dc.subject D72
dc.subject H53
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject pensions
dc.subject income effect
dc.subject tax burden
dc.subject politico-economic Markovian equilibrium
dc.subject Flexible Altersgrenze
dc.subject Soziale Sicherung
dc.subject Sozialversicherungsbeitrag
dc.subject Public Choice
dc.subject Einkommenseffekt
dc.subject Alternde Bevölkerung
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Early retirement and social security : a long term perspective
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


الملفات في هذه المادة

الملفات الحجم الصيغة عرض

لا توجد أي ملفات مرتبطة بهذه المادة.

هذه المادة تبدو في المجموعات التالية:

أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط