Why is fiscal policy often procyclical?

dc.creator	Alesina, Alberto
dc.creator	Tabellini, Guido
dc.date	2005
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:02:26Z
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:02:26Z
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19020
dc.identifier	ppn:503671800
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19020
dc.description	Many countries, especially developing ones, follow procyclical fiscal policies, namely spending goes up (taxes go down) in booms and spending goes down (taxes go up) in recessions. We provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for less-than-benevolent government to appropriate rents. Voters have incentives similar to the "starving the Leviathan" classic argument, and demand more public goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when the economy is doing well. We test this argument against more traditional explanations based purely on borrowing constraints, with a reasonable amount of success.
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1556
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject	H6
dc.subject	H3
dc.subject	ddc:330
dc.subject	Finanzpolitik
dc.subject	Konjunktur
dc.subject	Public Choice
dc.subject	Wahlverhalten
dc.subject	Korruption
dc.subject	Theorie
dc.subject	OECD-Staaten
dc.subject	Entwicklungsländer
dc.title	Why is fiscal policy often procyclical?
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper

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