أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Breitscheidel, Jörg
dc.creator Gersbach, Hans
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:02:19Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:02:19Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18992
dc.identifier ppn:500828423
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18992
dc.description We explore the design of self-financing tax/subsidy mechanisms to solve hold-up problems in environmental regulation. Under Cournot competition, announcing the subsidy rate seems to be preferable to announcing the tax rate. Moreover, for constant marginal damage the hold-up problem can always be solved by setting subsidies. Under Bertrand competition, only announcing the tax rate can induce at least one firm to invest. We suggest that feebate systems in the automotive sector should be designed as self-financing tax/subsidy mechanisms.
dc.language eng
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1528
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject D43
dc.subject Q28
dc.subject L50
dc.subject D62
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject hold-up problems
dc.subject environmental regulation
dc.subject taxes and subsidies
dc.subject self-financing mechanisms
dc.subject emission control
dc.subject Umweltpolitik
dc.subject Umweltabgabe
dc.subject Subvention
dc.subject Steueraufkommen
dc.subject Wohlfahrtseffekt
dc.subject Theorie
dc.subject hold-up problems
dc.title Self-financing environmental mechanisms
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط