أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Bisin, Alberto
dc.creator Gottardi, Piero
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:02:13Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:02:13Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18968
dc.identifier ppn:500528594
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18968
dc.description Do Walrasian markets function orderly in the presence of adverse selection? In particular, is their outcome efficient? This paper addresses these questions in the context of a Rothschild and Stiglitz insurance economy. We identify an externality associated with the presence of adverse selection as a special form of consumption externality. Consequently, we show that while competitive equilibria always exist, they are not typically incentive efficient. However, as markets for pollution rights can internalize environmental externalities, markets for consumption rights can be designed so as to internalize the consumption externality due to adverse selection. With such markets competitive equilibria exist and are always incentive efficient. Moreover, any incentive efficient allocation can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1504
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject D50
dc.subject G22
dc.subject D62
dc.subject D82
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Adverse Selection
dc.subject Konsuminterdependenz
dc.subject Versicherungsökonomik
dc.subject Allgemeines Gleichgewicht
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Efficient competitive equilibria with adverse selection
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط