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S-based taxation under default risk

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dc.creator Panteghini, Paolo M.
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:02:11Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:02:11Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18960
dc.identifier ppn:500514798
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18960
dc.description This article studies the characteristics of a S-based tax system under default risk. In particular we show that its neutrality properties depend on whether debt is protected or unprotected. In the former case, this system is neutral. In the latter case, where default timing is optimally chosen by shareholders, the S-based system is neutral with respect to real decisions only if the firm?s and the lender?s tax rate are equal. However, the shareholders? decision to default is always distorted.
dc.language eng
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1496
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject H32
dc.subject H25
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject capital structure
dc.subject corporate taxation
dc.subject neutrality
dc.subject option pricing
dc.subject Unternehmensbesteuerung
dc.subject Duale Einkommensteuer
dc.subject Zins
dc.subject Steuerbegünstigung
dc.subject Kreditrisiko
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title S-based taxation under default risk
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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