| dc.creator |
Leininger, Wolfgang |
|
| dc.date |
2004 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:01:53Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:01:53Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18904 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:472458817 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18904 |
|
| dc.description |
The implications of evolutionarily stable behavior in finite populations have recently been explored for a variety of aggregative games. This note proves an intimate relationship between submodularity and global evolutionary stability of strategies for these games, which -apart from being of independent interest - accounts for a number of results obtained in the recent literature: we show that any evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of a submodular aggregative game must also be globally stable. I.e. if one mutant cannot successfully invade a population, any number of mutants can even less do so. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
|
|
| dc.relation |
CESifo working papers 1266 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
C79 |
|
| dc.subject |
D72 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
Evolutionäre Spieltheorie |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
Fending off one means fending off all : evolutionary stability in submodular games |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|