أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Kanniainen, Vesa
dc.creator Pääkkönen, Jenni
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:01:51Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:01:51Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18896
dc.identifier ppn:393434591
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18896
dc.description Some markets are prone to develop shadow transactions for the purpose of tax avoidance. Moral sentiments control the allocation of consumers between the legal and illicit markets. Such sentiments include self-esteem and social disapproval. The market solution leads to fiscal externality resulting from tax avoidance and highlights the conflict between private opportunism and collective values. Shadow markets may, however, enhance consumer welfare by limiting the pricing power of firms and by controlling tax collection. The paper develops a model of endogenous segmentation of markets between moral and immoral behavior. The legal producer can price the self-esteem of honest people, who can blackmail the legal producer with their option of visiting the illicit market. The model has implications for monetary economics: moral sentiments, tax rates, illegal transactions, and probability of being caught become relevant for the demand for money.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1258
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject D43
dc.subject L13
dc.subject H26
dc.subject E41
dc.subject D69
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject moral sentiments
dc.subject shadow economy
dc.subject welfare
dc.subject Ethik
dc.subject Schattenwirtschaft
dc.subject Wohlfahrtseffekt
dc.title Anonymous money, moral sentiments and welfare
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط