Insecure property rights and growth : the roles of appropriation costs, wealth effects, and heterogeneity

dc.creator	van Long, Ngo
dc.creator	Sorger, Gerhard
dc.date	2004
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:01:49Z
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:01:49Z
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18891
dc.identifier	ppn:470755571
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18891
dc.description	We extend the model of insecure property rights by Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Tornell and Lane (1999) by adding three features: (i) extracting the common property asset involves a private appropriation cost, (ii) agents derive utility from wealth as well as from consumption, and (iii) agents can be heterogeneous. We show that both an increase in the appropriation cost and, when appropriation costs vary across agents, an increase in the degree of heterogeneity of these costs reduce the growth rate of the public capital stock. We also show that, in the interior equilibrium, the private asset can have either a lower or a higher money rate of return than the common property asset.
dc.language	eng
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1253
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject	O40
dc.subject	C73
dc.subject	ddc:330
dc.subject	corruption
dc.subject	property rights
dc.subject	growth
dc.subject	appropriation cost
dc.subject	Eigentumsrecht
dc.subject	Wirtschaftswachstum
dc.subject	Korruption
dc.subject	Theorie
dc.title	Insecure property rights and growth : the roles of appropriation costs, wealth effects, and heterogeneity
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper

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