| dc.creator |
Vogelsang, Ingo |
|
| dc.date |
2005 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:01:32Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:01:32Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18838 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:488945666 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18838 |
|
| dc.description |
Performance-based regulation (PBR) is influenced by the Bayesian and non-Bayesian incentive mechanisms. While Bayesian incentives are impractical, the insights from their properties can be combined with practical non-Bayesian mechanisms for application to transmission pricing. This combination suggests an approach based on the distinction between ultra-short, short and long periods. Ultra-short periods are marked by real-time pricing of point-to-point transmission services. Pricing in short periods involves fixed fees and adjustments via price-cap formulas or profit sharing. Productivity-enhancing incentives have to be tempered by long-term commitment considerations, so that profit sharing may dominate pure price caps. Investment incentives require long-term adjustments based on rate-of-return regulation with a ?used and useful? criterion. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
|
|
| dc.relation |
CESifo working papers 1474 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
L5 |
|
| dc.subject |
L9 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
Stromtarif |
|
| dc.subject |
Stromnetz |
|
| dc.subject |
Netzzugang |
|
| dc.subject |
Unternehmensregulierung |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
Electricity transmission pricing and performance-based regulation |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|