أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Blumkin, Tomer
dc.creator Sadka, Efraim
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:01:25Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:01:25Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18804
dc.identifier ppn:485162237
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18804
dc.description We illustrate a novel informational feature of education, which the government may utilize. Discretionary decisions of individuals to acquire education may serve as an additional signal (to earned labor income) on the underlying unobserved innate earning ability, thereby mitigating the informational constraint faced by the government. We establish a case for taxing education, as a supplement to the labor income tax.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1440
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject D6
dc.subject H2
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject optimal taxation
dc.subject re-distribution
dc.subject education
dc.subject inequality
dc.subject Schulfinanzierung
dc.subject Optimale Besteuerung
dc.subject Einkommensumverteilung
dc.subject Bildungsverhalten
dc.subject Signalling
dc.subject Bildungsertrag
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title A case for taxing education
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


الملفات في هذه المادة

الملفات الحجم الصيغة عرض

لا توجد أي ملفات مرتبطة بهذه المادة.

هذه المادة تبدو في المجموعات التالية:

أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط