dc.creator |
Bellettini, Giorgio |
|
dc.creator |
Ceroni, Carlotta Berti |
|
dc.date |
2005 |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:01:20Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:01:20Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18785 |
|
dc.identifier |
ppn:484732897 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18785 |
|
dc.description |
This paper studies the determinants of immigration policy in an economy with entrepreneurs and workers where a trade union has monopoly power over wages. The presence of the union leads a benevolent government to implement a high level of immigration and induces a welfare loss not only from an aggregate point of view, but even from the point of view of workers. In the politico-economic equilibrium where interest groups lobby for immigration, we show the condition under which workers are no longer hurt by the presence of the union. |
|
dc.language |
eng |
|
dc.publisher |
|
|
dc.relation |
CESifo working papers 1421 |
|
dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
dc.subject |
J61 |
|
dc.subject |
J51 |
|
dc.subject |
F22 |
|
dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
dc.subject |
Einwanderung |
|
dc.subject |
Migrationspolitik |
|
dc.subject |
Lohnpolitik |
|
dc.subject |
Gewerkschaftlicher Organisationsgrad |
|
dc.subject |
Wohlfahrtseffekt |
|
dc.subject |
Interessenpolitik |
|
dc.subject |
Public Choice |
|
dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
dc.title |
When the union hurts the workers : a positive analysis of immigration policy |
|
dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|