Designing benefit rules for flexible retirement with or without redistribution

dc.creator	Simonovits, András
dc.date	2004
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:01:03Z
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:01:03Z
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18733
dc.identifier	ppn:477488730
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18733
dc.description	The traditional approach to flexible retirement (e.g. NDC) neglects the impact of asymmetric information on actuarial fairness (neutrality). The mechanism design approach (e.g. Diamond, 2003) gives up the requirement of neutrality and looks for a redistributive second-best benefit-retirement-age schedule. Trying to combine the two approaches, the present paper determines the neutral (redistribution-free) second-best solution. This neutral solution is, however, often Pareto-dominated by the redistributive one.
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1370
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject	D82
dc.subject	H55
dc.subject	D91
dc.subject	ddc:330
dc.subject	flexible retirement
dc.subject	asymmetric information
dc.subject	actuarial fairness (neutrality)
dc.subject	mechanism design
dc.subject	Flexible Altersgrenze
dc.subject	Versicherungstechnik
dc.subject	Asymmetrische Information
dc.subject	Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
dc.subject	Second Best
dc.subject	Theorie
dc.title	Designing benefit rules for flexible retirement with or without redistribution
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper

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