أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Falkinger, Josef
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:01:02Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:01:02Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18731
dc.identifier ppn:477486061
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18731
dc.description In small groups norm enforcement is provided by mutual punishment and reward. In large societies we have enforcement institutions. This paper shows how such institutions can emerge as a decentralized equilibrium. In a first stage, individuals invest in a public enforcement technology. This technology generates a sanctioning system whose effectiveness depends on the aggregate amount of invested resources. In a second stage, in which individuals contribute to the provision of a public good, the sanctioning system imposes penalties and rewards on deviations from the endogenous norm contribution. It is shown that even if group size goes to infinity public norm enforcement is supported in a noncooperative equilibrium. Psychological factors are not necessary but can be favorable for the emergence of effective public norm enforcement.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1368
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject K40
dc.subject H41
dc.subject Z13
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject norm enforcement
dc.subject public goods
dc.subject institutions
dc.subject sanctioning
dc.subject Rechtsdurchsetzung
dc.subject Normbefolgung
dc.subject Öffentliches Gut
dc.subject Soziale Gruppe
dc.subject Soziale Norm
dc.subject Nichtkooperatives Spiel
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Noncooperative support of public norm enforcement in large societies
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط