DSpace Repository

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

Show simple item record

dc.creator Heinemann, Frank
dc.creator Nagel, Rosemarie
dc.creator Ockenfels, Peter
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:01:01Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:01:01Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18727
dc.identifier ppn:477413706
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18727
dc.description This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects? certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age. From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects? behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1364
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject C72
dc.subject D84
dc.subject D81
dc.subject C91
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Nichtkooperatives Spiel
dc.subject Koordination
dc.subject Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit
dc.subject Messung
dc.subject Experiment
dc.title Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


Files in this item

Files Size Format View

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search DSpace


Advanced Search

Browse

My Account