أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Hainz, Christa
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:01:01Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:01:01Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18725
dc.identifier ppn:477509967
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18725
dc.description The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank?s decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it loses the rent from incumbent customers that is due to its informational advantage. We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium in which the optimal number of firms is liquidated. There is also a range where improving institutions may decrease the number of bad firms liquidated.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1362
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject K10
dc.subject G33
dc.subject G21
dc.subject D82
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject credit markets
dc.subject institutions
dc.subject bank competition
dc.subject information sharing
dc.subject bankruptcy
dc.subject relationship banking
dc.subject Konkurs
dc.subject Liquidation
dc.subject Bankgeschäft
dc.subject Firmenkundengeschäft
dc.subject Asymmetrische Information
dc.subject Institutionelle Infrastruktur
dc.title Quality of institutions, credit markets and bankruptcy
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط