| dc.creator |
Berger, Helge |
|
| dc.creator |
Mueller, Till |
|
| dc.date |
2004 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:00:57Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:00:57Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18707 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:477413463 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18707 |
|
| dc.description |
The likely extension of the euro area has triggered a debate on the organization of the ECB, in particular on the apparent mismatch between relative economic size and voting rights in the Council. We present a simple model of optimal representation in a federal central bank addressing this question. Optimal voting weights reflect two opposing forces: the wish to insulate common monetary policy from changing preferences at the national level, and the attempt to avoid an overly active or passive reaction to idiosyncratic national economic shocks. A perfect match between economic size and voting rights is rarely optimal, and neither is the ?one country, one vote principle?. Empirically, there are indications that the pattern of over- and under-representation of member countries in the ECB Council might be extreme by the standards of the US Fed and German Bundesbank and not always optimal. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
|
|
| dc.relation |
CESifo working papers 1344 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
E52 |
|
| dc.subject |
D72 |
|
| dc.subject |
F33 |
|
| dc.subject |
E58 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
Central Bank |
|
| dc.subject |
Federal Central Bank |
|
| dc.subject |
Currency Union |
|
| dc.subject |
optimal representation |
|
| dc.subject |
voting |
|
| dc.subject |
ECB |
|
| dc.subject |
Zentralbank |
|
| dc.subject |
Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion |
|
| dc.subject |
Abstimmungsregel |
|
| dc.subject |
Landesgrösse |
|
| dc.subject |
Geldpolitik |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.subject |
EU-Staaten |
|
| dc.title |
How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union? |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|