أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Baake, Pio
dc.creator Kameckey, Ulrich
dc.date 2006
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:00:05Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:00:05Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18461
dc.identifier ppn:510324460
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18461
dc.description We consider a model with two firms operating their individual networks. Each firm can choose its price as well as its investment to build up its network. Assuming a skewed distribution of consumers, our model leads to an asymmetric market structure with one firm choosing higher investments. While access regulation imposed on the dominant firm leads to lower prices, positive welfare effects are diminished by strategic investment decisions of the firms. Within a dynamic game with indirect network effects leading to potentially increased demand, regulation can substantially lower aggregate social welfare. Conditional access holidays can alleviate regulatory failure.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin
dc.relation DIW-Diskussionspapiere 568
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject L51
dc.subject D43
dc.subject L13
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Regulation
dc.subject network effects
dc.subject natural monopoly
dc.subject Stromnetz
dc.subject Netzzugang
dc.subject Elektrizitätswirtschaft
dc.subject Regulierung
dc.subject Niederlande
dc.subject EU-Staaten
dc.subject Großbritannien
dc.subject Neuseeland
dc.title New Networks, Competition and Regulation
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط