| dc.creator |
Baake, Pio |
|
| dc.creator |
Mitusch, Kay |
|
| dc.date |
2005 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T06:59:36Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T06:59:36Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18351 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:494462701 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18351 |
|
| dc.description |
We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile{to{mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles' market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects are strengthened. Therefore, `collusion' may well be in line with social welfare. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin |
|
| dc.relation |
DIW-Diskussionspapiere 500 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
L41 |
|
| dc.subject |
L96 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
telecommunication |
|
| dc.subject |
mobile phones |
|
| dc.subject |
mobile-to-mobile access charges |
|
| dc.subject |
network effects |
|
| dc.title |
Mobile Phone Termination Charges with Asymmetric Regulation |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|