| dc.creator |
Inderst, Roman |
|
| dc.creator |
Wey, Christian |
|
| dc.date |
2005 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T06:59:28Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T06:59:28Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18315 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:47865720X |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18315 |
|
| dc.description |
This paper argues that - in contrast to an often expressed view - the formation of larger and more powerful buyers need not reduce welfare by stifling suppliers´ incentives. If contracts are determined in bilateral negotiations, the presence of larger buyers may both increase suppliers´incentives for product improvement and induce suppliers to choose a more efficient technology. The paper also isolates two di¤erent channels by which larger buyers can obtain a discount. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin |
|
| dc.relation |
DIW-Diskussionspapiere 464 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
Buyer power ; Merger ; Retailing |
|
| dc.subject |
Nachfragemacht |
|
| dc.subject |
Marktstruktur |
|
| dc.subject |
Wohlfahrtseffekt |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|