Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives

dc.creator	Inderst, Roman
dc.creator	Wey, Christian
dc.date	2005
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T06:59:28Z
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T06:59:28Z
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18315
dc.identifier	ppn:47865720X
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18315
dc.description	This paper argues that - in contrast to an often expressed view - the formation of larger and more powerful buyers need not reduce welfare by stifling suppliers´ incentives. If contracts are determined in bilateral negotiations, the presence of larger buyers may both increase suppliers´incentives for product improvement and induce suppliers to choose a more efficient technology. The paper also isolates two di¤erent channels by which larger buyers can obtain a discount.
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher	Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin
dc.relation	DIW-Diskussionspapiere 464
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject	ddc:330
dc.subject	Buyer power ; Merger ; Retailing
dc.subject	Nachfragemacht
dc.subject	Marktstruktur
dc.subject	Wohlfahrtseffekt
dc.subject	Theorie
dc.title	Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper

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