| dc.creator |
Zhang, Zhentang |
|
| dc.date |
2002 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T06:59:16Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T06:59:16Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18279 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:353286915 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18279 |
|
| dc.description |
This paper investigates the strategic value of the managerial incentive scheme in affecting firms' incentive in R&D investment and their product market activities. Firstly, we find that in Cournot-quantity competition, owners strategically assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost-reducing R&D, and have higher output, lower prices and lower profits, as compared to profit-maximizers in an owner-run game. Secondly, we find that R&D collusion induces owners in a delegation game to choose more aggressive managerial incentives as compared to R&D competition, which in turn leads to increased R&D investment, reduced product prices and increased profits. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin |
|
| dc.relation |
DIW-Diskussionspapiere 295 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
O32 |
|
| dc.subject |
L22 |
|
| dc.subject |
D20 |
|
| dc.subject |
C72 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
Strategic Delegation |
|
| dc.subject |
Managerial Incentives |
|
| dc.subject |
R&D competition and R&D collusion |
|
| dc.subject |
Industrielle Forschung |
|
| dc.subject |
Wettbewerb |
|
| dc.subject |
Duopol |
|
| dc.subject |
Führungskräfte |
|
| dc.subject |
Leistungsanreiz |
|
| dc.subject |
Vertrag |
|
| dc.subject |
Anreizvertrag |
|
| dc.subject |
Spieltheorie |
|
| dc.subject |
Forschungskooperation |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
Managerial incentives, innovation and product market competition |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|