DSpace Repository

Provision of Social Goods and Soft Budget Constraints

Show simple item record

dc.creator Zhang, Zhentang
dc.creator Röller, Lars-Hendrik
dc.date 2003
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T06:58:22Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T06:58:22Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18120
dc.identifier ppn:378407082
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18120
dc.description Firms in socialist and transitional economies are often obliged to provide a social good in addition to a private good, which makes it difficult for a government to commit not to bail out the firm once it is in financial trouble. This creates a soft budget constraint syndrome which causes the firm to underinvest ex ante in order to extract state subsidy and thereby reduces dynamic efficiency. In this paper, we show that separating the provision of social goods from private goods can harden budget constraints, while introducing competition into the private market may not.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin
dc.relation DIW-Diskussionspapiere 360
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Betriebliche Sozialleistungen
dc.subject Budgetrestriktion
dc.subject Übergangswirtschaft
dc.subject Reorganisation
dc.subject Theorie der Unternehmung
dc.subject Public Choice
dc.title Provision of Social Goods and Soft Budget Constraints
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


Files in this item

Files Size Format View

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search DSpace


Advanced Search

Browse

My Account