| dc.creator |
Brücker, Herbert |
|
| dc.creator |
Schröder, Philipp J. H. |
|
| dc.creator |
Weise, Christian |
|
| dc.date |
2003 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T06:58:09Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T06:58:09Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18078 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:369048555 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18078 |
|
| dc.description |
This paper discusses the eastward enlargement process of the EU in the framework of a simple war of attrition bargaining game. Both players – the existing EU members and the applicants – benefit from enlargement, yet for the applicants reform to the acquis is costly, while the EU prefers substantially reformed candidates. A waiting game unfolds. Within this framework the present enlargement round is analyzed and policy results are deduced. For example, it is shown that delegating the evaluation of applicants to a third party, compensating applicants for their reform efforts or increasing the benefits for new members are all effective negotiation strategies for the EU that have been applied in the process. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin |
|
| dc.relation |
DIW-Diskussionspapiere 342 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
EU enlargement |
|
| dc.subject |
eastern enlargement |
|
| dc.subject |
bargaining |
|
| dc.subject |
reform |
|
| dc.subject |
war of attrition |
|
| dc.subject |
EU-Erweiterung |
|
| dc.subject |
Verhandlungstheorie |
|
| dc.subject |
Signalling |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.subject |
Osteuropa |
|
| dc.subject |
war of attrition |
|
| dc.title |
Doorkeepers and Gatecrashers: EU Enlargement and Negotiation Strategies |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|