| dc.creator |
Haller, Hans |
|
| dc.creator |
Sarangi, Sudipta |
|
| dc.date |
2003 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T06:58:09Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T06:58:09Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18073 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:370777174 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18073 |
|
| dc.description |
A non-cooperative model of network formation is developed. Agents form links with others based on the cost of the link and its assessed benefit. Link formation is one-sided, i.e., agents can initiate links with other agents without their consent, provided the agent forming the link makes the appropriate investment. Information flow is two-way. The model builds on the work of Bala and Goyal, but allows for agent heterogeneity. Whereas they permit links to fail with a certain common probability, in our model the probability of failure can be different for different links. We investigate Nash networks that exhibit connectedness and super-connectedness. We provide an explicit characterization of certain star networks. Efficiency and Pareto-optimality issues are discussed through examples. We explore alternative model specifications to address potential shortcomings. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin |
|
| dc.relation |
DIW-Diskussionspapiere 337 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
D83 |
|
| dc.subject |
D82 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
Soziales Netzwerk |
|
| dc.subject |
Informationsverbreitung |
|
| dc.subject |
Nash-Gleichgewicht |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
Nash Networks with Heterogeneous Agents |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|