أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Haller, Hans
dc.creator Sarangi, Sudipta
dc.date 2003
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T06:58:09Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T06:58:09Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18073
dc.identifier ppn:370777174
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18073
dc.description A non-cooperative model of network formation is developed. Agents form links with others based on the cost of the link and its assessed benefit. Link formation is one-sided, i.e., agents can initiate links with other agents without their consent, provided the agent forming the link makes the appropriate investment. Information flow is two-way. The model builds on the work of Bala and Goyal, but allows for agent heterogeneity. Whereas they permit links to fail with a certain common probability, in our model the probability of failure can be different for different links. We investigate Nash networks that exhibit connectedness and super-connectedness. We provide an explicit characterization of certain star networks. Efficiency and Pareto-optimality issues are discussed through examples. We explore alternative model specifications to address potential shortcomings.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin
dc.relation DIW-Diskussionspapiere 337
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject D83
dc.subject D82
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Soziales Netzwerk
dc.subject Informationsverbreitung
dc.subject Nash-Gleichgewicht
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Nash Networks with Heterogeneous Agents
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط