| dc.creator |
Borck, Rainald |
|
| dc.date |
2003 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T06:58:07Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T06:58:07Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18071 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:369048423 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18071 |
|
| dc.description |
This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capital endowment is smaller than average. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin |
|
| dc.relation |
DIW-Diskussionspapiere 335 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
D72 |
|
| dc.subject |
H77 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
tax competition |
|
| dc.subject |
voting |
|
| dc.subject |
Steuerwettbewerb |
|
| dc.subject |
Steuersystem |
|
| dc.subject |
Public Choice |
|
| dc.subject |
Abstimmungsregel |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
Tax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Model |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|