Voting on Redistribution with Tax Evasion

dc.creator	Borck, Rainald
dc.date	2003
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T06:58:07Z
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T06:58:07Z
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18065
dc.identifier	ppn:368872882
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18065
dc.description	This paper analyzes voting on a linear income tax which is redistributed lump sum to the taxpayers. Individuals can evade taxes, which leads to penalties if evasion is detected. Since preferences satisfy neither single peakedness nor single crossing, an equilibrium may not exist. When it does exist, it may have interesting properties, in particular, the poor and the rich may form a coalition against the middle class.
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher	Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin
dc.relation	DIW-Diskussionspapiere 329
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject	D72
dc.subject	H26
dc.subject	ddc:330
dc.subject	Tax evasion
dc.subject	redistribution
dc.subject	voting
dc.subject	Einkommensumverteilung
dc.subject	Einkommensteuerpolitik
dc.subject	Abstimmung
dc.subject	Steuervermeidung
dc.subject	Theorie
dc.title	Voting on Redistribution with Tax Evasion
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper

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