Minority Voting and Public Project Provision

dc.creator	Gersbach, Hans
dc.date	2007
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T06:57:30Z
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T06:57:30Z
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/17943
dc.identifier	ppn:558204961
dc.identifier	RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:5567
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/17943
dc.description	We propose a two-stage process called minority voting to allocate public projects in a polity. In the first period, a society decides by a simple majority decision whether to provide the public project. If the proposal in the first period is rejected, the process ends. Otherwise the process continues, but only the members of the minority keep agenda and voting rights for the second stage, in which the financing scheme is determined. In the second stage, the unanimity rule or the simple majority rule is applied. We provide a first round of relative welfare comparisons between minority voting and simple majority voting and outline our research program.
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher	Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel
dc.relation	Economics Discussion Papers / Institut für Weltwirtschaft 2007-20
dc.rights	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en
dc.subject	D60
dc.subject	D72
dc.subject	H40
dc.subject	ddc:330
dc.subject	democratic constitutions
dc.subject	minority voting
dc.subject	public projects
dc.title	Minority Voting and Public Project Provision
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper

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