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Minority Voting and Public Project Provision

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dc.creator Gersbach, Hans
dc.date 2007
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T06:57:30Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T06:57:30Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/17943
dc.identifier ppn:558204961
dc.identifier RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:5567
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/17943
dc.description We propose a two-stage process called minority voting to allocate public projects in a polity. In the first period, a society decides by a simple majority decision whether to provide the public project. If the proposal in the first period is rejected, the process ends. Otherwise the process continues, but only the members of the minority keep agenda and voting rights for the second stage, in which the financing scheme is determined. In the second stage, the unanimity rule or the simple majority rule is applied. We provide a first round of relative welfare comparisons between minority voting and simple majority voting and outline our research program.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel
dc.relation Economics Discussion Papers / Institut für Weltwirtschaft 2007-20
dc.rights http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en
dc.subject D60
dc.subject D72
dc.subject H40
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject democratic constitutions
dc.subject minority voting
dc.subject public projects
dc.title Minority Voting and Public Project Provision
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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