المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

A Simple Coase-Like Mechanism that Transfers Control of Government Spending Levels from Politicians to Voters

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dc.creator Graves, Philip E.
dc.date 2007
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T06:57:28Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T06:57:28Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/17935
dc.identifier ppn:558073867
dc.identifier RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:5526
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/17935
dc.description Elected representatives have little incentive to pursue the interests of those electing them once they are elected. This well-known principle-agent problem leads, in a variety of theories of government, to nonoptimally large levels of government expenditure. An implication is that budgetary rules are seen as necessary to constrain politicians? tax and spending behavior. Popular among such constraints are various Balanced Budget Amendment proposals. These approaches, however, are shown here to have serious limitations, including failure to address the central concern of spending level. An alternative approach is advanced here that relies on a Coase-like mechanism that transfers control of government spending to the voter. Prisoner's dilemma incentives and political competition are seen to be critical to the superiority of the present mechanism to approaches requiring budget balance.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel
dc.relation Economics Discussion Papers / Institut für Weltwirtschaft 2007-12
dc.rights http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en
dc.subject H61
dc.subject H62
dc.subject H72
dc.subject H11
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject political incentives
dc.subject government spending
dc.subject mechanism design
dc.subject balanced budget amendments
dc.title A Simple Coase-Like Mechanism that Transfers Control of Government Spending Levels from Politicians to Voters
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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