أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Raff, Horst
dc.creator Ryan, Michael
dc.creator Stähler, Frank
dc.date 2008
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T06:57:18Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T06:57:18Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/17895
dc.identifier ppn:571526640
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/17895
dc.description This paper studies why multinational firms often share ownership of a foreign affiliate with a local partner even in the absence of government restrictions on ownership. We show that shared ownership may arise, if (i) the partner owns assets that are potentially important for the investment project, and (ii) the value of these assets is private information. In this context shared ownership acts as a screening device. Our model predicts that the multinational?s ownership share is increasing in its productivity, with the most productive multinationals choosing not to rely on a foreign partner at all. This prediction is shown to be consistent with data on the ownership choices of Japanese multinationals.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel
dc.relation Kieler Arbeitspapiere 1433
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject L20
dc.subject F23
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Foreign direct investment
dc.subject multinational enterprise
dc.subject joint venture
dc.subject productivity
dc.subject Multinationales Unternehmen
dc.subject Direktinvestition
dc.subject Joint Venture
dc.subject Asymmetrische Information
dc.subject Produktivität
dc.subject Eigentümerstruktur
dc.subject Schätzung
dc.subject Theorie
dc.subject Japan
dc.title Whole versus Shared Ownership of Foreign Affiliates
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


الملفات في هذه المادة

الملفات الحجم الصيغة عرض

لا توجد أي ملفات مرتبطة بهذه المادة.

هذه المادة تبدو في المجموعات التالية:

أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط