| dc.creator |
Schertler, Andrea |
|
| dc.date |
2000 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T06:56:29Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T06:56:29Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/17715 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:323915795 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/17715 |
|
| dc.description |
The relationship between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur is modeled to investigate the impact of public subsidies on venture capital investments in start-up enterprises. In this model, the venture capitalist only finances start-up enterprises if he has sufficient expertise to make high-risk investments in new technology profitable in terms of their expected value. It is shown that a venture capitalist who already has sufficient expertise reduces his management support in the start-up enterprise under a public subsidy. Moreover, venture capitalists who do not have sufficient expertise may finance start-up enterprises if future losses of the start-up investment are partly covered by the government. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel |
|
| dc.relation |
Kieler Arbeitspapiere 1018 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
L14 |
|
| dc.subject |
G28 |
|
| dc.subject |
G24 |
|
| dc.subject |
D82 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
venture capital |
|
| dc.subject |
double-sided moral hazard |
|
| dc.subject |
public subsidies |
|
| dc.subject |
start-up investments |
|
| dc.subject |
Risikokapital |
|
| dc.subject |
Unternehmensgründung |
|
| dc.subject |
Investition |
|
| dc.subject |
Finanzierung |
|
| dc.subject |
Investitionspolitik |
|
| dc.subject |
Subvention |
|
| dc.subject |
Moral Hazard |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
The Impact of Public Subsidies on Venture Capital Investments in Start-Up Enterprises |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|