أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Artige, Lionel
dc.creator Nicolini, Rosella
dc.date 2008-03-03T18:03:57Z
dc.date 2008-03-03T18:03:57Z
dc.date 2008-02-01
dc.date.accessioned 2017-01-31T01:00:33Z
dc.date.available 2017-01-31T01:00:33Z
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10261/3140
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/3140
dc.description The objective of this paper is to identify the role of memory in repeated contracts with moral hazard in financial intermediation. We use the database we have built containing the contracts signed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EBRD between 1991 and 2003. Our framework is a standard setting of repeated moral hazard. After having controlled for the adverse selection component, we are able to prove that client reputation is the discrimination device according to which the bank fixes the amount of credit for the established clients. Our results unambiguously isolate the effect of memory in the bank's lending decisions.
dc.description R. Nicolini research is supported by Ramón y Cajal and by Barcelona Economics Program of XREA. Financial support from research grants 2005SGR00470 and SEJ2005-01427/ECON is acknowledged.
dc.description Peer reviewed
dc.format 265216 bytes
dc.format application/pdf
dc.language eng
dc.relation UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation 724.08
dc.rights openAccess
dc.subject Financial Contracts
dc.subject Incentives
dc.subject Investment
dc.subject Memory
dc.subject Moral Hazard
dc.title Memory in Contracts: The Experience of the EBRD (1991-2003)
dc.type Documento de trabajo


الملفات في هذه المادة

الملفات الحجم الصيغة عرض

لا توجد أي ملفات مرتبطة بهذه المادة.

هذه المادة تبدو في المجموعات التالية:

أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط