أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط
| dc.creator |
Guillén, Pablo |
|
| dc.creator |
Schwieren, Christiane |
|
| dc.creator |
Staffiero, Gianandrea |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-14T08:52:15Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-14T08:52:15Z |
|
| dc.date |
2004 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:58:35Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:58:35Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/2109 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/2109 |
|
| dc.description |
Using a step-level public good game, we analyze the effects on contributions
of having played under a sanctioning regime. We find that ”educational” effects,
in terms of learning a particular way to coordinate towards ”good” equilibria, are
more relevant than motivational ”crowding out” effects, whereby cooperating to
avoid sanctions spoils intrinsic incentives. If groups vote, they decide to remove the
costly sanctioning regime; then they cooperate as much as in automatic removal
only when this decision entails a clear ”trust” message. |
|
| dc.description |
Peer reviewed |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
IESA Working Paper Series |
|
| dc.relation |
WP 04-04 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Public Good |
|
| dc.subject |
Step-level |
|
| dc.subject |
Sanctioning Institution |
|
| dc.subject |
Cooperation |
|
| dc.subject |
Education |
|
| dc.subject |
Trust |
|
| dc.title |
Feeding the Leviathan |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|
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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط