| dc.creator |
Brañas-Garza, Pablo |
|
| dc.creator |
Morales, Antonio J. |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-14T08:46:22Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-14T08:46:22Z |
|
| dc.date |
2004-05-05 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:58:34Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:58:34Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/2106 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/2106 |
|
| dc.description |
A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “Revisiting Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma”. |
|
| dc.description |
In this paper we obtain the value that experimental subjects attach to a prisoners’ dilemma game by applying a related procedure to BDM (1964). We also obtain the value of a closely related game
which does not incorporate any social dilemma. By comparing both values, we are able to classify subjects in different categories: (i) 16% of the subjects responded to the social dilemma by playing the cooperative strategy, (ii) The remaining subjects (84%) did not played the
cooperative strategy and moreover, 53% of the subjects behaved as if the social dilemma was not an issue at all. |
|
| dc.description |
Financial support from centrA: is acknowledged. Pablo Brañas acknowledges
the hospitality of IESA-CSIC during this research. Antonio J. Morales acknowledges
financial support from MCYT and FEDER grant number BEC 2002-02852. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
IESA Working Paper Series |
|
| dc.relation |
WP 07-04 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Prisoner's dilemma |
|
| dc.subject |
Payment cards |
|
| dc.subject |
Social conflict |
|
| dc.title |
How do subjects assess the Social Trade-off invilved in the Prisoners' Dilemma? |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|