| dc.creator |
Andersson, Staffan |
|
| dc.creator |
Martínez Cousinou, Gloria |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-13T14:52:22Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-13T14:52:22Z |
|
| dc.date |
2006 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:58:27Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:58:27Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/2062 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/2062 |
|
| dc.description |
Existing case studies of control of political corruption often lack a theoretical framework that can provide for systematic empirical research and comparisons between cases and countries.
To remedy this, we apply principal-agent theory qualitatively to study the United Kingdom, with a particular emphasis given to an in-depth study of control measures employed to Parliament, the Executive and political parties. We give a detailed account of the approach undertaken to control political corruption in these risk areas for corruption, and discuss its
implications and why some types of measures prevail over others. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
IESA Working Paper Series |
|
| dc.relation |
WP 18-06 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Principal-agent theory |
|
| dc.subject |
Corruption control |
|
| dc.subject |
Danger zone |
|
| dc.subject |
Institutions |
|
| dc.subject |
United Kingdom |
|
| dc.title |
Controlling Political Corruption in the United Kingdom |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|