| dc.creator |
Bester, Helmut |
|
| dc.creator |
Sákovics, József |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-08T16:00:58Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-08T16:00:58Z |
|
| dc.date |
1998-12 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:58:15Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:58:15Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1966 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1966 |
|
| dc.description |
Trabajo publicado como artículo en Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 45(4): 459-473 (2001).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00157-3 |
|
| dc.description |
This paper examines the commitment e ect of delegated bargain-
ing when renegotiation of the delegation contract cannot be ruled
out. We consider a seller who can either bargain face-to-face with a
prospective buyer or hire an intermediary to bargain on her behalf.
The intermediary is able to interrupt his negotiation with the buyer
to renegotiate the delegation contract. In this model, the time cost of
renegotiation prevents a full elimination of the commitment e ect of
delegation. In particular, there are always gains from delegation when
the players are su ciently patient. An extension of the basic model to
a search market shows that the gains from delegation are negatively
related to the e ciency of search. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
UFAE and IAE Working Papers |
|
| dc.relation |
440.99 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Bargaining |
|
| dc.subject |
Commitment |
|
| dc.subject |
Delegation |
|
| dc.subject |
Renegotiation |
|
| dc.title |
Delegated Bargaining And Renegotiation |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|