DSpace Repository

Right To Choose In Oral Auctions

Show simple item record

dc.creator Burguet, Roberto
dc.date 2007-11-08T15:57:10Z
dc.date 2007-11-08T15:57:10Z
dc.date 1999-01
dc.date.accessioned 2017-01-31T00:58:15Z
dc.date.available 2017-01-31T00:58:15Z
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1964
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1964
dc.description Trabajo publicado como artículo en Economics Letters 95(2): 167-173 (2007).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.09.028
dc.description Oral, right-to-choose auctions raise higher revenue when buyers are risk averse. When standard sequential and right-to-choose auctions allocate the objects en the same fashion, this means that sellers prefer the latter, which is consistent with normal practice in sales of real estate, for instance. Prices follow a declining pattern, as has also been observed.
dc.language eng
dc.relation UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation 439.99
dc.rights openAccess
dc.subject Right to chosse
dc.subject Oral auctions
dc.title Right To Choose In Oral Auctions
dc.type Documento de trabajo


Files in this item

Files Size Format View

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search DSpace


Advanced Search

Browse

My Account