أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط
| dc.creator |
Massó, Jordi |
|
| dc.creator |
Neme, Alejandro |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-08T15:35:47Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-08T15:35:47Z |
|
| dc.date |
1999-03 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:58:14Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:58:14Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1955 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1955 |
|
| dc.description |
The consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
UFAE and IAE Working Papers |
|
| dc.relation |
434.99 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Division problem |
|
| dc.title |
Maximal Domain Of Preferences In The Division Problem |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط