| dc.creator |
Pérez-Castrillo, David |
|
| dc.creator |
Wettstein, David |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-08T15:22:57Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-08T15:22:57Z |
|
| dc.date |
2000-06 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:58:14Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:58:14Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1952 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1952 |
|
| dc.description |
We propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero-monotonic environments with transferable utility. The mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage. We show that the
subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the Shapley value payoffs. We extend our results to implement the weighted Shapley values. Finally, we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility environments. The modified mechanism generates an efficient coalition structure, and implements the Shapley values of the super-additive cover of the environment. |
|
| dc.description |
Pérez-Castrillo acknowledges financial support from the DGES PB 97-0181 and SGR 96-75. Part of this research was conducted while Wettstein was visiting the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, with a grant from the Generalitat de Catalunya, and both authors were visiting the University of Copenhagen, whose financial support is acknowledged. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
UFAE and IAE Working Papers |
|
| dc.relation |
461.00 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Shapley value |
|
| dc.subject |
Implementation |
|
| dc.subject |
Simple mechanism |
|
| dc.subject |
Coalition formation |
|
| dc.title |
Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|