| dc.creator |
Beviá, Carmen |
|
| dc.creator |
Corchón, Luis C. |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-06T15:47:58Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-06T15:47:58Z |
|
| dc.date |
2002-10 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:58:13Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:58:13Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1942 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1942 |
|
| dc.description |
In this paper we consider a model of cooperative production in which rational agents have the possibility to engage in sabotage activities that decrease output. It is shown that sabotage depends on the interplay between the degree of congestion, the technology of sabotage, the number of agents the degree of meritocracy and the form of the sharing rule. In particular it is shown that, ceteries paribus, meritocratic systems give more incentives to sabotage than egalitarian systems. We address two questions: The degree of meritocracy that is compatible with absence of sabotage and the existence of a Nash equilibrium with and without sabotage. |
|
| dc.description |
The first author acknowledges financial support from DGCYT and Direcció General de Recerca under projects BEC2002-02130, and 2000SGR-00054 and the second author from CAYCIT PB98-0024. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
UFAE and IAE Working Papers |
|
| dc.relation |
541.02 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.title |
Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|