أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Pérez-Castrillo, David
dc.creator Sotomayor, Marilda
dc.date 2007-11-06T13:38:28Z
dc.date 2007-11-06T13:38:28Z
dc.date 2000-08-01
dc.date.accessioned 2017-01-31T00:58:13Z
dc.date.available 2017-01-31T00:58:13Z
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1938
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1938
dc.description Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 0704.
dc.description For the assignment game, we analyze the following mechanism: sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first; then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy, if any, among the remaining objects. The first phase of the game determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines the actual matching. We prove that the set of subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies in the strong sense of the mechanism coincides with the set of sellers' optimal stable outcomes when buyers use maximal strategies. That is, the mechanism leads to the maximum equilibrium prices and to an optimal matching.
dc.description Pérez-Castrillo acknowledges the financial support from projects DGES PB 92-0590, DGES PB 96-1192, and SGR 98-62. Sotomayor acknowledges J.S. Guggenheim Foundation, FAPESP, and FIPE - Sao Paulo - Brazil.
dc.description Peer reviewed
dc.language eng
dc.relation UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation 421.98
dc.rights openAccess
dc.subject Matching model
dc.subject Assignment model
dc.subject Mechanisms
dc.subject Implementation
dc.title A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure
dc.type Documento de trabajo


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط