A Dual Characterization of Incentive Efficiency

dc.creator	Jerez, Belén
dc.date	2007-11-06T11:01:35Z
dc.date	2007-11-06T11:01:35Z
dc.date	2001-09-10
dc.date.accessioned	2017-01-31T00:58:11Z
dc.date.available	2017-01-31T00:58:11Z
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1919
dc.identifier.uri	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1919
dc.description	We show that incentive efficient allocations in economies with adverse selection and moral hazard can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete characterization of the optima. Our dual analysis identifies welfare effects associated with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information. Because these welfare effects may generate non-convexities, incentive efficient allocations may involve randomization. Other properties of incentive efficient allocations are also derived.
dc.language	eng
dc.relation	UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation	494.01
dc.rights	openAccess
dc.subject	Asymmetric information
dc.subject	Incentive efficiency
dc.subject	Linear programming
dc.subject	Duality
dc.title	A Dual Characterization of Incentive Efficiency
dc.type	Documento de trabajo

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