| dc.creator |
Mutuswami, Suresh |
|
| dc.creator |
Pérez-Castrillo, David |
|
| dc.creator |
Wettstein, David |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-06T10:31:52Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-06T10:31:52Z |
|
| dc.date |
2001-02-26 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:58:09Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:58:09Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1903 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1903 |
|
| dc.description |
In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need both to both form a network and decide how to share the output generated. For both scenarios, we suggest a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid for the right to decide upon the organization of the economic activity. The subgame perfect equilibria of this game generate efficient outcomes. |
|
| dc.description |
Pérez-Castrillo acknowledges financial support from BEC2000-0172 and 2000SGR-00054. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
UFAE and IAE Working Papers |
|
| dc.relation |
479.01 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Bidding |
|
| dc.subject |
Implementation |
|
| dc.subject |
Networks |
|
| dc.subject |
Public goods |
|
| dc.title |
Bidding for the Surplus: Realizing Efficient Outcomes in General Economic Environments |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|