| dc.creator |
Barberà, Salvador |
|
| dc.creator |
Massó, Jordi |
|
| dc.creator |
Neme, Alejandro |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-06T10:27:50Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-06T10:27:50Z |
|
| dc.date |
2001-10-23 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:58:09Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:58:09Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1901 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1901 |
|
| dc.description |
We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
UFAE and IAE Working Papers |
|
| dc.relation |
501.01 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Voting |
|
| dc.subject |
Strategy-proofness |
|
| dc.subject |
Additive and Separable Preferences |
|
| dc.title |
Voting by Committees under Constraints |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|