المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

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dc.creator Jarque, Xavier
dc.creator Ponsatí, Clara
dc.creator Sákovics, József
dc.date 2007-11-06T10:25:01Z
dc.date 2007-11-06T10:25:01Z
dc.date 2001-11-22
dc.date.accessioned 2017-01-31T00:58:09Z
dc.date.available 2017-01-31T00:58:09Z
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1900
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1900
dc.description Trabajo publicado como artículo en Journal of Mathematical Economics 39(7): 803-830 (2003).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00048-X
dc.description We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.
dc.language eng
dc.relation UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation 502.01
dc.rights openAccess
dc.subject Noncooperative games
dc.subject Bargaining theory
dc.title Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication
dc.type Documento de trabajo


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