أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Pezanis-Christou, Paul
dc.creator Romeu, Andrés
dc.date 2007-11-06T08:57:56Z
dc.date 2007-11-06T08:57:56Z
dc.date 2002-11-19
dc.date.accessioned 2017-01-31T00:58:05Z
dc.date.available 2017-01-31T00:58:05Z
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1890
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1890
dc.description We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction experiments. We identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion when bidders private valuations are independent and uniformly drawn. The outcomes of our study indicate that behavior may have been affected by the procedure used to conduct the experiments and that the usual Nash equilibrium model for heterogeneous constant relative risk averse bidders does not consistently explain the observed overbidding. From an empirical standpoint, our analysis shows the possible drawbacks of overlooking the homogeneity hypothesis when testing symmetric equilibrium models of bidding and it puts in perspective the sensitivity of structural inferences to the available information.
dc.description Financial support from the European Commission through a EU-TMR ENDEAR Network grant (FMRX-CT98-0238) and from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (Grant BEC-2001-0980) is acknowledged.
dc.language eng
dc.relation UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation 531.02
dc.rights openAccess
dc.subject First-price auctions
dc.subject Private independent values
dc.subject Experimental data
dc.subject Structural econometric methods
dc.subject Non Linear Least Squares
dc.subject Constant relative risk aversion
dc.title Structural Inferences from First-Price Auction Experiments
dc.type Documento de trabajo


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط