أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Banal-Estañol, Albert
dc.date 2007-11-06T08:20:17Z
dc.date 2007-11-06T08:20:17Z
dc.date 2002-10-28
dc.date.accessioned 2017-01-31T00:58:03Z
dc.date.available 2017-01-31T00:58:03Z
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1869
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1869
dc.description We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.
dc.description Financial support from the European Commission (Marie Curie scholarship), Generalitat de Catalunya and research grant BEC 200-0172 is gratefully acknowledged.
dc.language eng
dc.relation UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation 544.02
dc.rights openAccess
dc.subject Horizontal Merger
dc.subject Uncertainty
dc.subject Information Sharing
dc.title Information-Sharing Implications of Horizontal Mergers
dc.type Documento de trabajo


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط