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Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

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dc.creator Abbink, Klaus
dc.creator Brandts, Jordi
dc.date 2007-11-06T08:09:29Z
dc.date 2007-11-06T08:09:29Z
dc.date 2002-11-01
dc.date.accessioned 2017-01-31T00:58:03Z
dc.date.available 2017-01-31T00:58:03Z
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1865
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1865
dc.description Trabajo publicado como artículo en Economic Inquiry 43(3): 636-648 (2005).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ei/cbi044
dc.description We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.
dc.description Financial support by the European Union through the TMR research network ENDEAR (FMRX-CT98-0238), the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Cultura (PB98-0465), and the University of Nottingham is gratefully acknowledged.
dc.language eng
dc.relation UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation 550.02
dc.rights openAccess
dc.subject Laboratory experiments
dc.subject Industrial organisation
dc.subject Oligopoly
dc.subject Price competition
dc.title Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis
dc.type Documento de trabajo


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