أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط
| dc.creator |
Porteiro, Nicolás |
|
| dc.creator |
Pérez-Castrillo, David |
|
| dc.creator |
Macho-Stadler, Inés |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-06T08:08:09Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-06T08:08:09Z |
|
| dc.date |
2002-06-14 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:58:03Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:58:03Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1864 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1864 |
|
| dc.description |
We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
UFAE and IAE Working Papers |
|
| dc.relation |
515.02 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Coalition formation |
|
| dc.subject |
Bilateral Agreements |
|
| dc.title |
Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|
الملفات في هذه المادة
|
لا توجد أي ملفات مرتبطة بهذه المادة.
|
هذه المادة تبدو في المجموعات التالية:
أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط