Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements

dc.creator	Porteiro, Nicolás
dc.creator	Pérez-Castrillo, David
dc.creator	Macho-Stadler, Inés
dc.date	2007-11-06T08:08:09Z
dc.date	2007-11-06T08:08:09Z
dc.date	2002-06-14
dc.date.accessioned	2017-01-31T00:58:03Z
dc.date.available	2017-01-31T00:58:03Z
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1864
dc.identifier.uri	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1864
dc.description	We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.
dc.language	eng
dc.relation	UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation	515.02
dc.rights	openAccess
dc.subject	Coalition formation
dc.subject	Bilateral Agreements
dc.title	Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements
dc.type	Documento de trabajo

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