المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Auctions for Government Securities: A Laboratory Comparison of Uniform, Discriminatory and Spanish Designs

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dc.creator Abbink, Klaus
dc.creator Brandts, Jordi
dc.creator Pezanis-Christou, Paul
dc.date 2007-11-06T08:07:11Z
dc.date 2007-11-06T08:07:11Z
dc.date 2002-11-01
dc.date.accessioned 2017-01-31T00:58:03Z
dc.date.available 2017-01-31T00:58:03Z
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1863
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1863
dc.description Trabajo publicado como artículo en Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 61(2): 284-303 (2006).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.12.007
dc.description The Bank of Spain uses a unique auction format to sell government bonds, which can be seen as a hybrid of a uniform and a discriminatory auction. For winning bids above the average winning bid, buyers are charged the average winning bid, otherwise they pay their respective bids. We report on an experiment that compares this auction format to the discriminatory format, used in most other countries, and to the uniform format. Our design is based on a common value model with multi-unit supply and two-unit demand. The results show significantly higher revenue with the Spanish and the uniform formats than with the discriminatory one, while volatility of prices over time is significantly lower in the discriminatory format than in the Spanish and uniform cases. Actual price dispersion is significantly larger in the discriminatory than in the Spanish. Our data also exhibit the use of bid-spreading strategies in all three designs.
dc.description Financial support by the European Union from a TMR-ENDEAR network grant (FMRX-CT98-0238) and from the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Cultura (PB98-0465) is gratefully acknowledged.
dc.language eng
dc.relation UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation 551.02
dc.rights openAccess
dc.subject Treasury
dc.subject Spanish auctions
dc.subject Discriminatory auctions
dc.subject Uniform auctions
dc.subject Multi-unit demand
dc.subject Common values
dc.subject Experimental economics
dc.title Auctions for Government Securities: A Laboratory Comparison of Uniform, Discriminatory and Spanish Designs
dc.type Documento de trabajo


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